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Abstract
In real-time streaming some content is to be distributed across agents while being produced. The source
sends each content unit to some agent as soon as its production has been completed, and next distribution
has to rely upon P2P (peer-to-peer) exchanges. We model this as a (intrinsically dynamic) congestion game
with strategy spaces containing time-sequences of agents as elements, because each player has to choose
who to ask for some content unit at each date (over a ﬁnite, discrete time-horizon). We identify a rather
large set of fastest streaming strategy proﬁles, each providing a streaming tree (i.e. a nested time-sequences
of directed trees specifying how each content unit reaches each peer) that distributes the whole content over
the whole population in a minimum number of steps. Still, these proﬁles are not sustainable as equilibria,
because they also result in null congestion, while selﬁsh optimization by individual players has to result
in some (strictly positive) congestion. Hence we look for those equilibria where streaming length is at
the minimum and congestion is also minimized. In particular, this is done in terms of strategy restriction
mechanisms. Thepotentialandsocialcostofequilibriumwithoutstrategyrestrictionsarealsoinvestigated.
Eventually, we propose an algorithm which fully exploits the advantages of strategy restrictions.
1. Department of Computer Science, University of Bologna, Mura Anteo Zamboni 7, 40126 Bologna, Italy; e-mail:
{giorossi,sferrett,gdangelo}@cs.unibo.it.
11 Introduction
1 Introduction
Real-time streaming is concerned with those many situations where some media content is pro-
duced and distributed in time. Speciﬁcally, one new content unit is periodically generated by a
source (or broadcaster) and made available to a set of interested users. Given the real-time gen-
eration of contents, a main issue is their timely dissemination. It is widely accepted that this can
be addressed with the creation of speciﬁcally designed overlay networks composed of the nodes
interested in the contents [22, 24]. In these networks, nodes (i.e. peers) collaborate toward data
dissemination by forwarding the received data. This Peer-to-Peer (P2P) based overlay network
can be built according to different approaches. In this view, two main concerns are the following:
i) the overall load due to forwarding activity should be evenly shared among the participants; ii)
the time needed for complete dissemination should be minimized; and iii) the protocol should
be fair in that the time needed for individuals to receive the whole content should not display to
much variance.
In recent times, game theory is proving very useful for modeling communication systems
and dynamic distributed environments. In this paper we model real-time streaming scenarios
in terms of multi-stage congestion games. Roughly speaking, in congestion games there is a
set of facilities and players have to choose what facilities to use, with a payoff that depends
on the number of players using the each facility. In other terms, each player gets some utility
from each used facility. In particular, the larger the number of players who use a facility, the
lower the utility that they receive from that facility (monotonicity). It may be anticipated that
congestion games are potential games and therefore admit pure-strategy (possibly strong, see
below) equilibria. When using congestion games for modeling real-time streaming, facilities are
players themselves: at any stage of the game, some content distribution over peers prevails and
therefore for any peer the facilities are those with some additional content units (i.e. possible data
forwarders).
Our modeling of real-time streaming in terms of congestion games allows to nicely distin-
guish between streaming length (i.e. the number of stages needed to completely disseminate the
whole content) and stage-wise congestion. Most importantly, we introduce a strategy restriction
mechanism which at each stage prevents each peer from asking certain content units, given the
prevailing content distribution over the population. The result is that with these restrictions, at
equilibrium, both streaming length and congestion are minimized. Accordingly, we develop a
distributed algorithm implementing such a strategy restriction stage-wise mechanism.
The paper structure is the following: in Section 2 some related work on multimedia stream-
ing is presented. Firstly considering the different communication architectures that have been
proposed in the literature, and next focusing on the theoretical results obtained employing game
theory in multimedia streaming. In Section 3, we introduce the basic concepts and notation that
is necessary to deﬁne our proposal. In Section 4, the problem of multimedia live streaming is pre-
sented as a congestion game. In Section 5 we focus on how to distribute the whole content over
the whole population in a minimum number of steps. In Section 6, we compute the maximum
streaming length (or worst case) induced by pure-strategy equilibria. In the following Section 7,
we show that a simple strategy restriction mechanism allows to reduce equilibrium streaming
length to its overall minimum. In Section 8 the described model is translated into a distributed
algorithm to be executed independently on each peer. A real showcase of the algorithm is given
in Section 9. Finally, some concluding remarks follow in Section 10.
2 Background and Related Work
This section reviews some related work on multimedia streaming approaches, with speciﬁc at-
tention devoted to those developed over peer-to-peer architectures.
Several examples exist of working streaming applications on the Internet. These are usually
based on the idea of constructing some kind of self-organizing and adaptive overlay network.
Examples worth of mention are Coolstreaming [1], End System Multicast (ESM) [2], Freecast [3],
Peercast [4], Vatata [6].
Different models to support streaming multicast applications have been proposed in time.
The very ﬁrst solutions were mostly based on the client-server model, i.e., all users retrieve the
content from a central server. The problem of this kind of approaches is the same observed for all
other kinds of centralized networked applications deployed over large networks, i.e., the server
could become the bottleneck of the system as the number of clients grows.
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Due to these problems, some proposals employ concurrently multiple servers (or proxies) to
offer much bandwidth, fault tolerance and scalability. HAMS [23], Overcast [24] and Scattercast
[14] architectures are examples of solutions which resort to a multi-tiered infrastructure to dis-
tribute contents. This allows to spread the load from a single server to a large pool of supporting
nodes, while end-users do not take an active role in the content distribution. A problem here
could be the need to have dedicated nodes acting as proxies/forwarders, which may be quite
expensive in terms of costs for allocating and managing these proxies.
The use of peer-to-peer model solves some of these issues, since users actively participate to
the content distribution, often without any need for central control. Peers’ collaboration offers a
cheap and scalable solution to stream contents to million of users. In this case, the crucial point
is that of identifying the best interaction protocol among peers, so as to maximize the global
performances of the system. The goodness of the protocol may be intended as a combination
of the time needed to stream the content (averaged among all participants), the amount of data
received in-time to be played out, a measure of the fairness for the data distribution.
2.1 Distribution Models for Streaming in Peer-to-Peer Networks
Several solutions exist to distribute content units among peers. A distinction is whether the
underlyingcommunicationnetworkisstructuredorunstructured. Intheformercase, peersagree
on some communication strategy and, from an organization point of view of the network, some
kind of overlay (tree, mesh, distributed hash table, etc.) is created to let peers communicate. In
the latter case, instead, a gossip scheme is utilized where peers to be contacted are randomly
selected among the complete set of peers, or a subset of it (i.e., the peer’s neighborhood). In other
words, nodes are let free to choose the node to interact with at each time period.
An important observation on gossiping is that while the data may be delivered quite rapidly
to a majority of peers, no bounds on the time to distribute a content to all peers may be pro-
vided. This problem may become even more evident when nodes compete in gaining the same
resources, as discussed in the next sections. When the set of peers to contact is decided in ad-
vance, as in a structured architecture, each peer maintains a forwarding list containing those
nodes that wait to receive new content units from it. In this case, different types of overlay net-
works may be employed for the distribution, e.g., single-tree, multi-tree, mesh, Distributed Hash
Table (DHT).
A tree-based communication protocol behaves quite simply, i.e., each new generated chuck
is disseminated trough the tree, from parent nodes towards child nodes. The difﬁculty here is
to build an optimized tree and maintain it in front of possible failures and node departures [40].
Well known examples of tree-based multicast approaches are ESM/Narada [2, 22], PeerCast [4]
and the approach presented in [41]. Multi-tree based approaches solve some limitations of a sin-
gle tree based distribution. Indeed, the stream can be divided into different portions which are
transmitted via different routes. This way, those nodes that are internal in a tree can be set to be
the leaves of other trees, hence guaranteeing a higher level of fairness in the data distribution.
Moreover, a multiple description coding distribution may be implemented. Thus, peers can sub-
scribe only to a subset of the sub-streams sent through different trees, if they prefer to receive
the stream at a lower data rate. Having multiple trees guarantee some higher level of reliabil-
ity. Chunkyspread [44], CoopNet [39], are examples of multi-tree based multimedia streaming
solutions.
As mentioned, in structured networks it is important to dynamic reorganize the overlay when
nodes join/leave the system. To cope with this issue, some schemes employ mesh structures
or DHTs as the underlying structure to route message and perform host lookup. Mesh based
approaches allow more communication channels for the distribution instead of the single route
of a tree. Similarly, DHTs present several features that guarantee a high level of reliability and
fault-tolerance, e.g., a leaf set and replication [43]. Anysee [30], PRIME [31], Together [26] and
Yoid [19] are examples of mesh-based multicast approaches. Splitstream [12], instead, employs
a DHT as the underlying structure to multicast data; in particular, Scribe [11] is exploited as the
application level multicast, thatinturnuses thePastryDHT[43]. Another example ofDHT-based
approach is [10].
Examplesofmesh-basedapproachesareCoolstreaming/DONet[1,46]andPPLive[20]. Here,
each peer periodically provides its neighborhood with a list of received content units [9]. Then,
neighbors may ask for some content. Other ones behave similar to BitTorrent; in this case, infor-
mation on who-has-what is stored in some globally known node, e.g., a tracker [16, 17, 5, 45]. This
allows to cope with the main weakness of these schemes i.e., the possible presence of free-riders,
at the cost of loosing decentralization in the architecture.
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2.2 Game Theory and Streaming
Recent studies have demonstrated the beneﬁts of employing theoretical results of game theory in
multimedia streaming. Indeed, the main goal of peer-to-peer streaming is to rapidly distribute
content units produced by broadcasters through voluntarily collaboration among peers. Hence,
it is important to identify strategies that eliminate the presence of free-riders, i.e., those peers that
try to take beneﬁt from the network without providing any contribution [18, 37].
In this sense, we already mentioned that approaches exist which are inspired to the BitTorrent
philosophy and employ a tit-for-tat policy, thus guaranteeing that every participant provides
service to others. Examples have been presented in [16, 17, 5, 45].
[29]presents apeer-to-peer streaming application intheBAR (Byzantine/Altruistic/Rational)
model. The idea is that of resorting to a gossip protocol where a pseudo-random partner selection
is employed to eliminate non-determinism and to make sure that peers are not tempted to not
respect the protocol, since this does not give any advantage to them. [27] copes with the problem
of free-riders in multicast by deﬁning a speciﬁc protocol modelled through a non-cooperative
game. Similar works, at least in terms of pursued objectives, have been presented in [13, 15]. In
[7], repeated game theory is used to develop a model of user behavior. In detail, robust overlays
are designed taking into account users’ incentives. Focusing on lower levels in the communi-
cation stack (i.e. transport), it is worth noting that game theoretical approaches can be used to
investigate the scenario where a number of self-regarding applications share a common bottle-
neck link and dynamically adapt their data rates to maximize the media quality delivered to
their respective users. In [33] is proposed a novel model to represent such systems by adopting
anevolutionary game theoretic approach thatcaptures how users adapt their ratestothenetwork
performances and the perceived quality.
Finding a strategy that maximizes the performances of the whole system involves the issue
of deﬁning the fairness of the protocol. This metric is utilized to identify whether all nodes
are offered the same service level [25]. Different metrics can be considered to decide whether a
distribution protocol is fair or not. For instance, let consider a tree-like distribution model. In
this particular case, only a subset of peers is engaged in the retransmission of received content
units, while other peers only receive the contents. This can be obviously be though as an unfair
scheme. On the other hand, it is more likely that those peers that retransmit the contents (i.e.,
the internal nodes) receive data before leaf nodes. Hence, from this point of view, leaf nodes
are treated unfairly because they need to wait that content units are delivered to other nodes,
before receiving them. This simple example suggests that the metric to evaluate a communication
protocol in a peer-to-peer streaming application should be carefully determined, based on several
(andoftenantithetic)parameters. Thefairnessoftheprotocolshouldbethoughtasacombination
of the variance of work accomplished by peers to distribute the content, as well as the variance
of time needed to receive contents.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to analyze this issue in detail. We basically identify
a strategy restriction mechanism and consequently, an algorithm, which guarantees that an efﬁ-
cient distribution of contents among a set of peers participating to the media streaming.
3 Preliminaries
In the following we aim to model the streaming of live-content in peer-to-peer networks taking
advantage of game theory. We consider that stream production is accomplished during a ﬁnite
time-sequence t = 0,1,...,T. Starting at time t = 0, a source provides one new unit ct of some
content at the beginning of each time-period t → t + 1, until the end T is reached, while n peers
aim at receiving all the content as soon as possible. This may be put into game-theoretical terms
in different ways. One is to regard it is as a a dynamic game [32] to be modeled through congestion
game forms [21, 35, 42] with player set N = {1,...,n}, naturals 1,...,n being peers’ identiﬁers.
Also, denote the source by 0, and let N0 = {0,1,...,n}.
A dynamic game is identiﬁed by a tree each of whose nodes corresponds to a moment at
which at least one player has to take action, and thereby rooted at the start, which here is when
the source has just ﬁnished producing the very ﬁrst content unit c0 and peers begin to line-up in
order to receive it. All nodes referring to any (ﬁxed) time t bijectively correspond to all distinct
courses the game may take up to t. Among them, which one is actually reached, for given course
till t, depends, of course, on what actions players take in t. But if, in addition, for given per node
actions what successive node is actually reached still depends on some random event, then the
game is stochastic. We assume perfect information, that is, when asked to take action, at any time
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t, all players know exactly what node has been reached at t (or, equivalently, the previous course
of the game). The leaves (or ﬁnal nodes) of the tree correspond to outcomes (on which players’
preferences need be deﬁned). All conceivable (whole) courses of the game bijectively correspond
to all paths connecting the root to some leaf. A strategy, for a player, speciﬁes an (admissible)
action to take at each node.
The rules of our game are as follows:
rule (i):
the source can send each unit ct,0 ≤ t ≤ T over time-period t → t+1 only (i.e. just after that unit
is produced) and, additionally, to only one (i.e. some) peer;
rule (ii):
if a peer at the end t of any time-period t − 1 → t has already received a collection ct1,...cth of
content units, where 0 ≤ t1,...,th < t, then in the following time-period t → t + 1, or round or
stage t, this peer can send only one of such units and, additionally, to one (i.e. some) other peer
only;
rule (iii):
each peer, over any time-period, can ask to receive some unit from only one (at most) peer or
source.
With these rules, spreading the whole content (or time-sequence of units)
CON = {c0,c1,...,ct,    ,cT} over the whole peer set surely requires much P2P exchange. In
particular, the source sends each unit precisely once, to only one peer, and therefore each unit
must next be P2P-exchanged exactly n − 1 times. Looking at the ﬁrst rounds, at t = 0 all peers
will surely ask for c0 from the source, but only one, possibly picked at random, and denoted
i0
1 ∈ N, will actually get it over time-period 0 → 1. Hence, at t = 1 some peers will ask for c1
from the source (with i0
1 surely among them), while the remaining ones will ask for c0 again, but
now from i0
1. Picking at random from each of these two peer subsets (complements of each other
in view of (ii) above) will yield someone, denoted i1
1, receiving c1 from the source (in round 1),
and someone else, denoted i0
2, receiving c0 from i0
1 (in round 1). This is where the price of anarchy
[15] may begin to be paid, because if i0
1 = i1
1, then in next round 2 only two content units will be
sent: c2 from the source to some peer (hopefully not i0
1 = i1
1 again), and either c0 or else c1 from
i0
1 = i1
1 to some other peer. This is clearly sub-optimal, because although three units are already
available, only two of them get actually distributed. Note that this reasoning relies upon the idea
that peers always satisfy some request as long as there is any.
For turning this setting into a game, the ﬁrst step consists in identifying the players, which
clearly are the peers. In fact, although the source may well itself have to make choices, still these
latter shall be typically non-strategic. Next, the nodes in the game tree have to be identiﬁed.
Formally, a time-indexed node Ct, referring to some time (or beginning of round) t, is a n+1-set
Ct = {Ct
0,Ct
1,...,Ct
n} whose elements are subsets Ct
i ⊆ {c0,c1,...,ct} specifying what content
units up to t each i ∈ N0 has received. Equivalently, a node Ct is a 0 − 1-matrix whose i,t′-entry
Ct
i(t′) ∈ {0,1} is deﬁned by Ct
i(t′) = 1 if ct
′
∈ Ct
i (i.e. if in node Ct peer/source i ∈ N0 has
unit ct
′
) and 0 otherwise. Note that Ct
0(t′) = 1 if t′ = t and 0 otherwise for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T, while
Ct
0(t′) = 0 for all t > T,t′ ≥ 0. That is, at any time the source only provides the unit that it has
just ﬁnished producing, and therefore no unit at all after T (see above). In our setting, unless
strategy restrictions are explicitly modeled (see below), all players may take action at each node.
Accordingly, a strategy must specify, for each peer i ∈ N and for each node Ct in the game tree,
some j ∈ N0 from whom to ask (in round t) some content unit ct
′
,0 ≤ t′ ≤ t (hopefully such that
ct
′
∈ Ct
j\Ct
i).
Hence, strategies shall be ﬁnite such sequences as long as some upper bound T∗ < ∞ on
duration (measured in rounds) of the game, over all conceivable courses, exists. Intuitively, as
peers are concerned with receiving some content while this latter is produced, sometime after
content production is ﬁnished nobody will any longer be interested in receiving any unit at all.
More formally, rational strategy proﬁles, under perfect information (and without free-riding),
surely provide a ﬁnite game course. In the sequel, the worst-case equilibrium streaming length
is observed in terms of the streaming tree, whose vertex set is N0 (i.e. the peers together with
the source), and through which each content unit spreads over the whole peer population. In
fact, the streaming tree is a nested time-sequence of sub-streaming trees, one for each content unit.
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Speciﬁcally, the whole streaming, from an ex post perspective, shall be uniquely identiﬁed by the
T +1 trees, with peers as vertexes, describing how each of the T +1 content units actually reaches
the whole population. In each of these trees edges are directed and, in particular, the in-degree
is 1 for each vertex (apart from the source, of course). That is, while peers may (and shall) send
some content units several times (to several different other peers, in different rounds), they will
receive each content unit only once.
Let N t denote the set of all game tree nodes referring to time t ≥ 0. In other terms, N t
identiﬁes the family of all (0 − 1-matrices specifying) content distributions over peers that may
be reached along some game course up to t. Recall that in any round each peer can forward at
most one unit and can also submit at most one request for receiving. In fact, N t is the set of all
content distributions over peers that may be reached at time t under such a main constraint. A
basic modeling choice we make is that a strategy Ai for peer i ∈ N has form Ai : N → N0, where
N = ∪
0≤t≤T∗
N t, and with Ai(C) = j denoting the one (i.e. peer or source) j ∈ N0 from whom i
asks to receive at game tree node C ∈ N. Hence j ∈ {0,...,i−1,i+1,...n}. On the other hand,
to keep notation at a minimum, we interpret Ai(C) = i as the case where peer i at node C does
not ask to receive any content, from anybody. In this way, all game tree nodes are uniﬁed into
a single set N, independently from what different game courses let them prevail, and at what
time. The resulting analysis provides behavioral rules according to which players respond to any
prevailing content distribution over the population, at any time. A main concern is what game
course length (intended as the number of rounds needed to distribute the whole content over the
whole population) may be the outcome of selﬁsh, node-wise optimization by players.
4 Congestion Games and Forms
In a congestion game form there is a set N of players and a set M of facilities, and each player
i ∈ N has a set Σi ⊆ 2M of strategies, where 2M is the (power) set of all subsets of M. For
example, M may be thought of as the edge set of some graph where each player i ∈ N has to go
from some starting vertex vi to some ﬁnal one v′
i. Then, the set Σi of strategies available to this
player contains all (edge sets of) existing paths connecting vi to v′
i.
A congestion game form F = (N,M,Σ1×   ×Σn) identiﬁes a whole class of congestion games,
each obtained by specifying the payoffs πi : Σ → R+ of players i ∈ N, where Σ = Σ1 ×     × Σn.
A proﬁle A = {A1,...,An} ∈ Σ of strategies identiﬁes congestion vector σ(A) = {σa(A) : a ∈ M}
specifying how many players have each facility a ∈ M in their strategy Ai. That is, σa(A) =
|{i ∈ N : a ∈ Ai}|. The game is monotone when each facility a ∈ M has an associated utility
function ua : Z+ → R+ satisfying ua(k) < ua(k′) whenever k > k′, and each i ∈ N gets a
payoff πi(A) =
 
a∈Ai ua(σa(A)) given by the sum over all the chosen facilities a ∈ Ai of the
corresponding utility. Finally, a congestion game form (and thus any game derived from it) is
symmetric when the strategy set is the same across players, that is, Σ1 =     = Σn [21].
Collaborative streaming systems may be approached in terms of congestion games where
facilities are, in fact, players themselves: in view of the above notation, every strategy proﬁle
A = (A1,...,An) has an associated congestion matrix σ(A) = {σi
C(A) : C ∈ N,i ∈ N0}, where
σi
C(A) =
    
j ∈ N : i = Aj(C),Ci  ⊆ Cj
    
is the number of peers who ask to receive from i ∈ N0 some content that this latter has but they
miss. That is to say, at any reached game tree node C ∈ N, if a peer asks to receive from someone
who has no additional content, than such a request is simply ignored by the system: it causes
null congestion. A request is valid if it contributes to congestion.
Denote by κ = |N| the whole number of game tree nodes. A strategy Ai, for a peer i ∈ N
may well be regarded as a point Ai ∈ Nκ
0 , as it speciﬁes somebody (although possibly with
no additional content or non valid) to ask from for each node C ∈ N that may be reached.
Accordingly,
F =

N,Nκ
0 ,Nκ
0 ×     × Nκ
0       
n


is the corresponding congestion game form. Basically, in game forms one has the n-product of
players’ strategy spaces, as in the deﬁnition of a game, but without the speciﬁcation of the utility
levels. In fact, given a congestion game form F, one can derive from it a whole family of monotone
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congestion games by assigning monotone utility levels. All such congestion games are said to be
derived from F.
Players’ payoffs πi : Nκn
0 → R+ are assumed to consist of a sum over nodes of some (pos-
sibly 0) utility or per node payoff received at each node C ∈ N. This utility is given from an ex
ante perspective: it depends on the prevailing content distribution over peers (which is precisely
what the game tree node C identiﬁes), and on the per node strategy proﬁle A1(C),...,An(C) that
players choose at node C. In this way, the per node payoff received by peers i ∈ N may well
depend on congestion, that is to say, on how many other peers i′ ∈ N have the same (valid) per
node strategy Ai
′
(C) = Ai(C). The aim is to model real-time streaming in terms of congestion
games with facilities being pairs (j,C) where j ∈ N0 is either a peer or the source, while C = Ct
is a game tree node or content distribution over peers that cannot be excluded to prevail at any
time t. Notice immediately that as long as peers can ask from at most one j ∈ N0 in each round
the resulting congestion game (form) is one where players’ strategies are sequences of singletons.
4.1 Payoffs
A general form for preferences obtains by letting the payoff πi(A) of any given strategy proﬁle
A ∈ Nκn
0 to a peer i ∈ N be given by the sum, over all conceivable game tree nodes C ∈ N, of
the values taken by utility uCj which depends on content difference2 Cj\Ci such that Ai(C) = j
as well as on congestion σ
j
C(A), that is,
πi(A) =
 
C∈N
 
j∈N0
Ai(C)=j
Cj ⊆Ci
uCj
 
Cj\Ci,σ
j
C(A)
 
. (1)
For any strategy proﬁle A, each peer i ∈ N gets some utility at each node C ∈ N, which depends
on:
- the difference in content Cj\Ci with respect to the peer or source j ∈ N0 from whom i asks to
receive at node C, that is, such that Ai(C) = j ∈ N0, and
- the number σ
j
C(A) of those with the same (valid) per node strategy, that is, on congestion.
Hence, the per node payoff uCj( , ) takes values on pairs (Cj\Ci,σ
j
C(A)) consisting of a set and
a natural number. Obviously, uCj(∅,k) = 0 for all k ≥ 1, and the sum indeed excludes those
cases where Cj ⊆ Ci. In particular, any choice of this latter type (i.e. asking to receive from
somebody with no additional content) is the same as when the peer asks to receive from itself,
that is, simply one way of choosing, say, the empty set. In our model (mainly for notational
convenience), players have to choose someone in each round, till T∗.
A (somehow deﬁnitive) condition that (1) may satisfy is
C1: k < k′ ⇒ uCj(C,k) > uCj(C′,k′) > 0 for all k,k′ ≥ 1 and ∅  = C,C′ ⊆ CON.
This represents some sort of lexicographic preferences: as soon as the ﬁrst argument is non-
empty, utility uCj starts depending exclusively on its second argument; in fact, C1 is a variation
of traditional monotonicity (see above); it states that independently from what different content
units a peer may receive from two different links, as long as both links lead to some (non-empty)
additional content it is always preferable to choose the one where congestion is lower. Also note
that C1 actually entails uCj(C,k) = uCj(C′,k) > 0 for all k ≥ 1 and ∅  = C,C′ ⊆ CON.
These preferences satisfy rather strong but still quite possible conditions: whenever a peer
i ∈ N considers whether to ask to receive from j ∈ N0 or else from j′ ∈ N0, both of which satisfy
Cj,Cj′  ⊆ Ci, what only matters is congestion, that is, σ
j
C(A) and σ
j
′
C(A). At any node, for each
peer, any two links through which some additional content may be received with strictly positive
probability are identical, regarded as facilities. The only remaining scale to differentiate between
the two of them is congestion: the lower the better, of course.
Utility uCj is Cj-indexed because, even when condition C1 is satisﬁed, still this function
is assumed to incorporate some Cj-speciﬁc features. After all, if peers (and/or the source),
endowed with content units, are regarded as facilities (available at certain game tree nodes),
then allowing for utility uCj to depend on Cj-speciﬁc features seems natural. For example, let
θ(Cj) =
 
ct∈Cj(t+1)
 
|Cj| − |Cj\ct−1|
 
, with c−1 := ∅. Note that the sum is over content units ct
2. The notation for dealing with content regards this latter as a set of units, either referring to a single peer, or else
identifying a game tree or content distribution over peers. In terms of 0 − 1 matrices, 1 and 0 clearly correspond to the
cases where the element is or is not in the speciﬁed set of content units.
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that j ∈ N0 is endowed with3 at node C. For each of such units ct, the sum checks whether j also
has the previous unit ct−1, at node C, or not, and if ct−1 is found then t + 1 is added. Although
deﬁnitely not the ﬁnest, still this is one way for measuring how good the set Cj of content units is
for someone (whoever) who makes a valid request from it4. Then, putting the uniform distribution
over the set {i ∈ N : Ai(C) = j,Cj  ⊆ Ci} of those who make a valid request from j, for all j ∈ N0
and C ∈ N, allows for payoff to take the following form
πi(A) =
 
C∈N
 
j∈N0
Ai(C)=j
Cj ⊆Ci
θ(Cj)
σ
j
C(A)
.
This speciﬁcation satisﬁes C1, which is rather strong. In fact, we cannot fully take into account
that the utility added by content received in any round may depend on how old the content is
when received. In our setting any (j,C) pair, where j ∈ N0 and C ∈ N, is a facility. The utility
that peers i may get by linking, as receivers, to j at node C depends, apart from congestion, on
Cj, that is, on what content j has at C. Still, this content may be more or less desirable, for i,
depending i’s content at C in turn, that is, Ci. If this latter is only a binary matter (i.e. either
j has some content that i misses or not), and then congestion determines utility uniquely, then
C1 applies. Conversely, one may like non-binary dependency of utility on Cj\Ci. Allowing for
this latter possibility requires (time-varying) P2P-speciﬁc (or player-speciﬁc [28, 34]) payoffs. Ac-
cordingly, consider the following conditions for (1). They are intended to possibly replace, all
together, condition C1.
C2: k < k′ ⇒ uCj(C,k) > uCj(C,k′) > 0 for all k,k′ ≥ 1 and ∅  = C ⊆ CON;
C3: C ⊃ C′ ⇒ uCj(C,k) > uCj(C′,k) > 0 for all k ≥ 1 and ∅  = C,C′ ⊆ CON, with ⊃ de-
noting strict inclusion;
C4: uCj(C,1) > uCj(C′,k) for all ∅  = C,C′ ⊆ CON and k > 1.
C2 clearly translates monotonicity in the usual sense, that is, with respect to congestion.
C3 translates monotonicity in terms of set functions: given congestion and any two links j,j′ ∈
N0 from both of which some additional content is available, if the additional content from one is
a proper superset of the additional content from the other, then utility from the former is strictly
greater than from the latter.
C4 translates risk aversion and is conceived under the general assumption that if a peer or the
source receives, at any node, some valid request to forward, then precisely one (picked at ran-
dom) will be satisﬁed. Then, for any j ∈ N0, if i ∈ N is the only one asking to receive from j
such that Cj  ⊆ Ci, then i surely receives one unit (possibly picked at random) in Cj\Ci  = ∅.
Accordingly, such a certain perspective is preferred to any uncertain one (i.e. where congestion
is > 1), independently from additional content (see below).
4.2 Strategy Conﬁgurations
Apart from the wide range of relevant applicative scenarios that congestion games do ﬁt, in non-
cooperative (or strategic) game theory they are known as a class possessing a non-empty set of
pure-strategy Nash equilibria [42]. In fact, the class of games that can be turned into congestion
ones is very large [35] (comprehending, for example, the prisoner’s dilemma). Perhaps most
importantly in our context, as long as monotonicity holds, these games allow to establish neat
conditions under which desirable properties, such as Pareto-optimality (and strength) of equilib-
rium, attain.
In terms of (1) above, strategy proﬁle A = (A1,...,An) is Pareto-optimal if there is no proﬁle
B = (B1,...,Bn) such that πi(B) ≥ πi(A) for all i ∈ N, with strict equality for at least one i.
Hence, from an aggregate perspective, Pareto-optimal proﬁles are efﬁcient: there is no chance of
improving someone’s payoff without deteriorating someone else’s one.
3. As Cj is the j-th component of game tree node C = {C0,C1,...,Cn}, this latter node shall refer to some time t + k
(that is, C ∈ Nt+k), k ≥ 1.
4. It turns out, for instance, that if θ(Cj) =
`T+2
2
´
, then Cj is the j-th component of a game tree node C referring to
sometime after content units have stopped being produced (i.e. C ∈ Nt,t > T) and j has received all T + 1 content
units c0,c1,...,cT directly from the source (see below).
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Table 1. Notation
Symbol Description
t = 0,1,...,T∗ time
t → t + 1,0 ≤ t ≤ T∗ round / stage t
ct t-th content unit
CON = {c0,c1,...,cT},T < T∗ whole content
CONt = {c0,c1,...,ct},t ≤ T content up to t
N = {1,...,n} peer set
N0 = {0,1,...,n} peer and source set
C = {C0,C1,...,Cn} game tree node
Ci ⊂ {c0,c1,...,ct} content with i,C
N set of game tree nodes
Ai : N → N0 a strategy for i ∈ N
Ai(C) ∈ N0,C ∈ N per node strategy
A = (A1,...,An) strategy proﬁle
σ(A) = {σi
C(A) ∈ Z+ : C ∈ N,i ∈ N0} congestion matrix
σi
C(A) =
    
j ∈ N : i = Aj(C),Ci  ⊆ Cj
     congestion at i,C
Pareto-optimality of equilibria in symmetric monotone congestion games is intimately linked
with the structure of the n-product Σ = ×i∈NΣi of strategy spaces. In particular, on whether a
bad conﬁguration appears or not. Formally, Σ displays a bad conﬁguration when there are three
strategies X,Y,Z ∈ Σ and two facilities x,y ∈ M such that x ∈ X  ∋ y and x  ∈ Y ∋ y but
x ∈ Z ∋ y. Thus, two facilities give rise to a bad conﬁguration if there are strategies in Σ which use one of
them but not the other, and there is also a strategy in Σ which uses both of them. The latter never occurs
if Σ consists of singletons [21, pp. 87-88]. As the name itself suggests, it is desirable that no bad
conﬁguration exists.
Here facilities are players themselves, although any ﬁxed player corresponds to two dis-
tinct facilities when referring to two distinct game tree nodes. This means that under the above
premises(i.e. thatineachroundeachplayerhastosatisfyonevalidrequestamongthosereceived
and can make at most one valid request to receive) strategies are time-sequences of singletons,
and hence the safe case applies.
Pure-strategy equilibria A ∈ Nκn
0 satisfy, for all i ∈ N and Bi ∈ Nκ
0 ,
πi(A−i,Ai) ≥ πi(A−i,Bi),
where A = (A−i,Ai), with A−i ∈ N
κ(n−1)
0 being the n − 1 proﬁle deﬁned by A for peers j ∈ N\i,
and similarly Ai ∈ Nκ
0 being the A-strategy for peer i.
An equilibrium A = (A1,...,An) is strong if for no coalition ∅  = S ⊆ N is there a choice of
Bi ∈ Nκ
0 for coalition members i ∈ S such that πi(BS,AS) > πi(A) for all coalition members
i ∈ S, where (BS,AS) denotes the proﬁle in which each i ∈ S chooses Bi and each j ∈ Sc = N\S
chooses Aj. In words, no coalition can deviate from strong equilibrium proﬁles and thereby
strictly increase the payoffs of all its members.
When considering the implications of strong equilibrium for S = N, one gets rather sim-
ilar conditions as those identifying Pareto-optimal proﬁles. In fact, as our strategies are time-
sequences of singletons, the model provided thus far (with (1) and C1 specifying payoffs) yields
a symmetric monotone congestion game with no bad conﬁguration, where therefore the set of
strong equilibria is non-empty, coincides with the set of equilibria and, generically, is (weakly)
included in the set of Pareto-optimal proﬁles [21].
4.3 Potential
Given payoff functions πi : Nκn
0 → R+ for peers i ∈ N, one may consider potentials.
Deﬁnition: P : Nκn
0 → R is a potential if for all i ∈ N, all n − 1-proﬁles A−i ∈ N
κ(n−1)
0 and all
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pairs Ai,Bi ∈ Nκ
0
[P(A−i,Ai) − P(A−i,Bi)][πi(A−i,Ai) − πi(A−i,Bi)] ≥ 0.
A potential is exact when the two differences within square parentheses are equal.
In words a potential takes values on strategy proﬁles, and for any such a proﬁle and unilat-
eral deviation from it, the deviating player’s payoff and the potential itself change in the same
direction. Exactness means that these changes are equal.
Claim: if payoffs (1) satisfy C1, then an exact potential is given, for all A ∈ Nκn
0 , by
P(A) =
 
C∈N
 
j∈N0
σ
j
C(A)  
k=1
uCj(k). (2)
Proof: ﬁrstly, C1 entails that utility uCj in (1) depends only congestion, in a monotone way, as
long as the request to receive is a valid one. Now ﬁx i ∈ N,Ai,Bi ∈ (N0)κ and a n − 1-proﬁle
A−i ∈ N
κ(n−1)
0 of strategies for peers j ∈ N,j  = i. Let A = (A−i,Ai) and B = (A−i,Bi), noting
that for those triples A,j,C such that σ
j
C(A) = 0 the last (i.e. third) summation vanishes. Con-
sider congestion matrices σ(A),σ(B) associated with proﬁles A and B. Their generic elements
σ
j
C(A),σ
j
C(B) differ only when at least one of
Ai(C) = j  = Bi(C) , Cj  ⊆ Ci
Ai(C)  = j = Bi(C) , Cj  ⊆ Ci
attains. In the former case σ
j
C(A) = σ
j
C(B)+1, while in the latter case σ
j
C(A) = σ
j
C(B)−1. Then,
P(A) − P(B) =
=
 
C∈N
 
j∈N0
Ai(C)=j =Bi(C)
Cj ⊆Ci
uCj(σ
j
C(A)) +
−
 
C∈N
 
j′∈N0
Ai(C) =j′=Bi(C)
Cj′ ⊆Ci
uCj′(σ
j
′
C(B)) =
= πi(A) − πi(B). •
Thisreads: themodelproposedthusfaryieldsapotentialgame[36]. Anypotential-maximizer
strategy is a (pure-strategy) equilibrium. In particular, for monotone congestion games with no
bad conﬁguration, (2) is a strong potential, any of whose maximizers is a strong equilibrium [21,
theorem 5.2].
5 Fastest Streaming
A natural indicator of streaming efﬁciency is the number of rounds needed to spread the whole
content CON over the whole peer set N. Assume the number of peers is a power of 2, that is,
n = 2m for some natural m. Under our assumptions, any content unit can spread over the whole
population no faster than through m + 1 (consecutive) rounds. For example, in round 0 the very
ﬁrst content unit c0 will go from the source to some peer i0
1. In round 1 it will go from i0
1 to some
other peer i0
2 ∈ N\i0
1. In round 2 it will go from i0
1,i0
2 to two distinct other peers i0
3,i0
4 ∈ N\{i0
1,i0
2},
and so on, doubling the forwards in each round, until in round m (which is the m + 1-th round
that this unit c0 circulates) exactly half of the population sends the content unit to the other half
through one-to-one matching. A crucial fact from now on is that all the T + 1 content units, for
any T, can spread over the whole peer set in exactly m+1 rounds. This can be observed in terms
of the different possibilities for building the whole streaming tree (see above). In particular, if a
generic content unit ct reaches everybody in m + 1 rounds, then the number of peers who send
(and therefore also the number of those who receive) this content unit ct in round t + k is 2k−1
for k = 1,...,m.
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If all content units must reach everybody in m+1 rounds, then whenever a peer receives a unit
ct in round t + k it must forward ct for the remaining rounds t + k + k′, where k′ = 1,...,m − k.
Hence, this peer for these latter rounds cannot receive units to be further forwarded. That is to
say, in any round t + k + k′, with k′ = 1,...,m − k, if this peer receives some unit, then such a
unit must be ct+k+k
′−m, in which case this round t+k +k′ is precisely the m+1-th (i.e. last) one
in which this unit ct+k+k
′−m circulates. In other words, the peer must be among those 2m−1 who
are the last ones to receive the unit that they receive. In particular, if a peer it
1 receives some unit
ct directly from the source (i.e. in round t), then the reasoning applies to all subsequent m rounds
t + h for h = 1,...,m. This not only is feasible, but can be obtained through many different
streaming trees (in all of which the sub-streaming tree for each unit must result from a suitable
permutation of vertexes always reproducing the same necessary condition: for each unit ct the
number of senders doubles after each round t + h for h = 1,...,m, vanishing afterward).
Deﬁnition: proﬁle A ∈ Nκn
0 is deterministic if
(I) for all i ∈ N both the following hold
(a)
    
C ∈ N : Ai(C) = j,Cj  ⊆ Ci
     = T + 1,
(b) Ai(C) = j,Cj  ⊆ Ci ⇒ |Cj\Ci| = 1 for all C ∈ N.
In these proﬁles, each peer makes exactly T + 1 valid requests to receive (which under rules
(i-iii) clearly is the minimum number of valid such requests needed to receive all the T +1 content
units c0,c1,...cT), and therefore receives some (distinct) content unit every time a valid request
is made. In addition, the T + 1 valid requests made by any peer i are all addressed, each at a
different game tree node, to someone who at that node has precisely one additional content unit.
Their name is due to the assumption that transitions from one game tree t-node Ct ∈ N t,t ≥ 0
to t+1-nodes Ct+1 ∈ N t+1 are stochastic. That is to say, a generic strategy proﬁle A does not yield
a unique game course, but a probability distribution over game courses. Whatever its form, an
underlying probabilistic model essentially decides who gets what when multiple peers i1,...,ik
ask to receive from a common j ∈ N0 such that Ct
j  ⊆ Ct
ik′,1 ≤ k′ ≤ k. As long as peers (and
the source) can forward one unit, at most, per round, the model has to select precisely one peer
ik′ ∈ {i1,...,ik} and one unit ct
′
∈ Ct
j\Ct
ik′ to be received by the former. Deterministic proﬁles
actually allow to ignore the underlying probabilistic model (which is intended to be complex and
mostly unknown), because the transition from any node to successive ones becomes determinis-
tic. In fact, each peer has to make at least T +1 valid requests in order to receive all the T +1 units
that, all together, constitute CON. If some peer makes strictly more than T + 1 valid requests,
then there is some round where the request is not satisﬁed, because someone else’s one is. But
then the former peer’s request could have been satisﬁed instead, making the resulting course
stochastic. In deterministic proﬁles this is avoided: each peer makes exactly T +1 valid requests.
In addition, peers always make valid requests to receive from someone who has precisely one
unit that they miss, and therefore they receive such a unit. Deterministic proﬁles put probability
1 on one game course and probability 0 on all other courses. Accordingly, consider the unique
content distribution over peers (or game tree node) reached at t by deterministic proﬁle A ∈ Nκn
0 .
In particular, denote it by Ct(A) = {Ct
0(A),Ct
1(A),...,Ct
n(A)}.
Deﬁnition: a deterministic proﬁle A ∈ Nκn
0 is fastest streaming if for all 0 < k ≤ t ≤ T∗
(II)
    
i ∈ N : Ct
i(A) ∋ ct−k     = min{2m,2k−1}.
These proﬁles spread each content unit ct over 20 = 1 peer in round t, over (new) 20 = 1 peer in
round t + 1, over (new) 21 = 2 peers in round t + 2, and so on, until (new and ﬁnal) 2m−1 peers
receive unit ct in round t + m, which is the m + 1-th (i.e. ﬁnal) round where this unit circulates.
Let A∗ denote the set of all fastest streaming proﬁles. Note that
 
0≤h<k 2h = 2k − 1, and
therefore summing newly reached peers across these m+1 rounds yields that each unit ct reaches
the whole population in m + 1 rounds, so that the whole peer set is covered at the end of round
t + m (i.e. at time t + m + 1). That is,
20 + 20 + 21 +     + 2m−1 = 20 + 2m − 1 = 2m.
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In addition, in these strategy proﬁles A ∈ A∗ peers i receive each and every time t they ask
someone (i.e. j = Ai(t) with Ct
j  ⊆ Ct
i) to send. Given that each peer in any round can receive
at most one unit and can also forward at most one further unit, these are rather demanding
conditions, and one may well wonder whether A∗  = ∅ at all. In fact, |A∗| is now shown to be a
quite large number.
Consider a generic t such that m ≤ t ≤ T∗ − m. According to any proﬁle A ∈ A∗ in round
t there are exactly m + 1 content units ct,ct−1,...,ct−m being distributed across the whole pop-
ulation, out of which precisely m (i.e. ct−1,ct−2,...,ct−m) are sent by some peers to some other
peers, while one unit (i.e. ct) is sent from the source to some suitably chosen peer. Hence, in such
a (generic) round t each peer is a receiver (of some unit ct−k,0 ≤ k ≤ m). Conversely, only 2m−1
peers are also senders (of units ct−k,1 ≤ k ≤ m), as there is also the source (who forwards unit
ct).
Conditions (I) and (II) may be turned into a useful recursive method for establishing, for any
course of the game reached up to any time t ≥ 0 (and thus applying since the very beginning),
how to proceed in round t in order to have a fastest, that is, A-induced for some A ∈ A∗, stream-
ing. In fact, all scheduling priorities can be captured by the following main constraint: for any
t ≥ 0, if in the previous round a peer has received and/or forwarded some unit that will have to
be forwarded in round t + 1 as well, then in this round t this peer cannot receive any unit that
will also have to be forwarded in round t + 1. Denote by Sk
t the subset of peers who send unit
ct−k in round t (with 1 ≤ k ≤ m), and by Rk
t the subset of peers who receive unit ct−k in the same
round t (with 0 ≤ k ≤ m).
Recurrence:
R1: if i ∈ Sk
t−1 or i ∈ Rk
t−1 for some k ≤ m − 2,
R2: or t ≥ m and i  ∈ Sk
t−1 for all k ≥ 1,
R3: then i  ∈ Rk
t for all k ≤ m − 1.
To see this, consider that any unit ct
′
has to be (still) forwarded in round t + 1 (i.e. over
t + 1 → t + 2) when t′ + m ≥ t + 1. Now focus on a generic unit ct−1−k that a peer is either
sending or else forwarding in round t − 1. Letting t′ = t − 1 − k we have that this unit will have
to be forwarded in round t + 1 if t − 1 − k + m ≥ t + 1, that is, if k ≤ m − 2. If this is the case,
then the peer cannot now (i.e. in round t) receive any unit ct−k such that t − k + m ≥ t + 1 or
k ≤ m − 1. On the other hand, condition R2 entails precisely that when we reach any round
m ≤ t ≤ T + m all peers who still have not received unit ct−m are matched with the other half of
the population, so to ultimately receive such a unit, that will no longer be distributed throughout
the whole streaming.
We now proceed to counting all streaming trees that satisfy this recurrence R1-3. Recall that
for naturals a ≥ b product [a]b = a(a − 1)(a − 2)   (a − b + 1) is the falling factorial [8]. Our
enumerative concern is with situations where T > m, and, in particular, the whole streaming
evolves through three phases:
Ph1: an initial phase comprehending all those initial rounds t = 0,1,...,T1 in which there is at
least one peer that does not receive any content unit,
Ph2: a central phase comprehending all those central rounds t = T1 + 1,T1 + 2,...,T1 + T2 in
which each peer receives some unit,
Ph3: a ﬁnal phase comprehending all rounds t > T1 +T2 where again at least one peer does not
receive any unit, although at least another peer receives some unit.
Claim: the number of fastest streaming proﬁles is
|A∗| = α1   α2   α3,
α1 =
m−1  
t=0
[2m − 2t + 1]2t,
α2 =
 
2m−1!
 2(T+1)−m
,
α3 =
m  
t=1
[2m−1]2m−1−2t−1.
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Proof: In view of (I), each A ∈ A∗ identiﬁes a unique, distinct streaming tree. On the other
hand, (II) entails that in rounds t = 0,1,2,...,m − 1 all needed receivers must be chosen among
those who still have not received anything, yielding 2t new peers involved in the streaming at
each round. As
 
0≤h<k 2h = 2k−1, at time m (i.e. at the end of round m−1 and at the beginning
of round m) all peers apart from one (i.e. 2m − 1) have received precisely one unit. For counting
the number of distinct ways to reach this point, consider that in each round t = 0,1,2,...,m − 1
we can select any of the
 2
m−2
t+1
2t
 
distinct 2t-cardinal subsets of peers who still have received
nothing, and then choose any of the 2t! one-to-one matching of the 2t − 1 senders inherited from
previous rounds, together with the source (thus yielding 2t indeed), with the newly selected
corresponding receivers. Thus, the number of distinct ways a streaming tree induced by some
A ∈ A∗ can evolve in rounds 0 to m − 1 inclusive is
m−1  
t=0
 
2m − 2t + 1
2t
 
2t! =
m−1  
t=0
[2m − 2t + 1]2t = α1.
However the system reaches this point, in the starting round m there are 2m−1 peers and the
source that must each send precisely one content unit, and therefore each and every peer must be
a receiver. In particular, this is the m + 1-th round in which the very ﬁrst unit c0 is in circulation,
and therefore at the end of the round all peers must have it. The sender peers can be partitioned
into m (disjoint) blocks with cardinalities 20,21,...,2m−1. Respectively, they contain those peers
who have content units cm−1,cm−2,...,c0. In addition to them there is the source, who in round
m will send precisely unit cm. By R1 and R3, all 2m−1 − 1 =
 
0≤k≤m−2 2k sender peers who
have units c1,c2,...,cm−1 must be matched, as receivers, with a corresponding number of those
2m−1 who have c0 to forward. Also, given R2, the remaining receiver peer to be matched with
some c0-sender can only be the unique one i∗ ∈ N who in previous (initial) rounds received
nothing. It seems worth emphasizing that from now on, until the very ﬁnal round t = T + m of
the (generic) fastest streaming we are building, peer i∗ will always be in the half of the population
who receives from the other half precisely the unit ct−m−1 whose distribution terminates in that
round. This peer never forwards any unit.
There are 2m−1! distinct one-to-one matching allowing for the exchange of unit c0, in round
t = m, involving precisely half of the peers as senders and the remaining half as receivers. Anal-
ogously, there are 2m−1! distinct ways for letting the 2m−1 peers who are c0-senders receive some
content unit either from the source or from some of those 20 + 21 +     + 2m−2 = 2m−1 − 1 other
peers who have units cm−1,cm−2,...,c1. Hence, in round m the streaming tree can evolve in
 
2m−1!
 2
different ways. The same applies to all rounds t = m,m + 1,...,T, in each of which
senders are the source, of course, together with 2m − 1 = |N\i∗| peers partitioned into m blocks
with cardinalities 20,21,...,2m−1 who send respectively units ct−1,ct−2,...,ct−m−1. Hence,
 
2m−1!
 2(T+1−m)
=
α2
(2m−1!)
m
different evolutions may occur between round m and round T inclusive.
Consider now rounds t = T +1,T +2,...,T +m. Initially (i.e. for t = T +1), the source is the
ﬁrst forwarder (of some ‘fresh’ unit) who vanishes. This means that someone among the 2m−1
peers who in round T + 1 forward unit cT+1−m no longer ﬁnds the source to receive from in this
round. Put it differently, those 2m−1 − 1 = 20 + 21 +     + 2m−2 who in round T + 1 forward
units cT,cT−1,...,cT+2−m have to deal with a demand equal to 2m−1 (i.e. in excess by 1). On the
other hand, there surely are 2m−1 who at (the beginning of round) T + 1 still miss cT+1−m, and
who therefore do receive it. This alone provides 2m−1! different evolutions. As for the side of
the streaming where the supply falls short, we can select any 2m−1 − 1-cardinal subset from the
2m−1-cardinal population of available receivers and match it anyhow with the available 2m−1−1
forwarders. Putting things together, in round T + 1 the streaming tree can evolve in
2m−1!
 
2m−1
2m−1 − 20
 
(2m−1 − 20)! = 2m−1![2m−1]2m−1−20
different ways. Also note that in this round T + 1 a unique peer i∗
T+1  = i∗ does not receive
any unit. Hence, at time t + 2 (i.e. at the end of this round T + 1) there is an additional peer
i∗
T+1 who, like i∗, still misses units cT+2−m,cT+3−m,...,cT. Accordingly, (in view of R2) in the
starting round T + 2 this peer i∗
T+1, as a receiver, matches some cT+2−m-sender. Till the end of
the streaming this peer will never be among those who receive units to be further forwarded,
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because these units that this peer still misses shall be distributed for the last time in the following
remaining rounds, one after the other consecutively, and the peer can receive only one unit per
round. That is, just like for i∗ from round t = m onward. The number of peers such as i∗
T+1
increases at a rate 2t−T−1 in all rounds t = T +1,T +2,...,T +m. In fact, in the last round T +m
half of the peer send (without receiving anything) what the other half receives.
In round T +2 we have again 2m−1 peers that give to the other half of the population the unit
whose distribution gets completed precisely in that round, which now is cT+2−m. Hence, again
we have 2m−1! different possible evolutions on one side of the streaming, the one through which
the distribution of some unit gets over. On the other side, again there are 2m−1 peers who are
available to receive any of the circulating units apart from cT+2−m, which is precisely the unit
that they forward, but there are only 2m−1 −21 available senders. Accordingly, we can select any
of the
  2
m−1
2m−1−21
 
feasible subsets of receivers, and anyhow match it with available senders. In this
round T + 2 the streaming tree can evolve in
2m−1!
 
2m−1
2m−1 − 21
 
(2m−1 − 21)! = 2m−1![2m−1]2m−1−21
different ways, using again
 a
b
 
=
[a]b
b! .
Now look at ﬁnal round t = T + m, where is only left to match anyhow those 2m−1 peers
who already have cT with the other half of the population. Hence, in the very ﬁnal round the
streaming tree can evolve in
2m−1! = 2m−1![2m−1]2m−1−2m−1 = 2m−1![2m−1]0
different ways, as [2m−1]0 = 1. In round t = T + m − 1 those 2m−1 peers who already have
cT−1 must be matched with the other half of the population, which yields further 2m−1! ways
of evolving, and 2m−2 new peers must be chosen to receive cT (for next forwarding it in the
following round). In view of the above observations, we can select any 2m−2-cardinal subset out
of those 2m−1 who now (i.e. in this round T + m − 1) forward unit cT−1 and match it anyhow
with the given available set of cT-senders, in
 
2m−1
2m−2
 
2m−2! = [2m−1]2m−2 = [2m−1]2m−1−2m−2
different ways. Concluding, between rounds T + 1 and T + m inclusive the streaming tree can
evolve in
m  
t=1
2m−1!
 
2m−1
2m−1 − 2t−1
 
(2m−1 − 2t−1)! =
=
 
2m−1!
 m
m  
t=1
[2m−1]2m−1−2t−1 =
 
2m−1!
 m
  α3
different ways. •
Hence, there are many different streaming tree evolutions that allow to spread the whole
content over the whole peer population in a way such that each unit ct reaches new 2k−1 peers in
each round t+k for k = 1,...,m. Inspection reveals that in all of them condition (I)-a is satisﬁed.
That is, at any node C and for any two peers i,j ∈ N we have |Ci\Cj| ∈ {0,1}. Fastest streaming
strategy proﬁles are not equilibria, because condition (I)-b is too demanding: at equilibrium peers
shall try to receive some unit in any round until they get the whole content (see below). In this
view, it is surely important to assess how long can be, at most, any streaming tree evolution
induced by some equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
6 Worst-case Equilibria
As long as strategy spaces are Nκn
0 (and payoffs (1) with either C1 or else C2-4), any fastest
streaming proﬁle is neither Pareto-optimal nor an equilibrium. To see this, simply consider the
very ﬁrst round t = 0. In any fastest streaming proﬁle only one peer asks to receive c0 from the
source. But all other peers would (strictly) increase their payoff by asking to receive c0 from the
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source as well. In this way, with some strictly positive probability they would be the one who
starts receiving ﬁrst, which is clearly preferable. Hence, fastest streaming proﬁles are Pareto-
dominated and non-equilibrium strategies. Still, they are undoubtedly desirable from an ag-
gregate perspective, as they enable to spread the whole content over the whole population in
a minimum (feasible) number of rounds and with minimal (i.e. null) congestion. Accordingly,
in view of what has been anticipated about bad conﬁgurations, attention now turns on those
strategy restrictions that provide minimal incentives to deviate from fastest streaming.
Given the P2P setting, where peers always satisfy precisely one (randomly selected) request
among those received, in each round the number of distributed units equals the number of those
who are asked to forward through some valid request. At equilibrium such a number equals
the number of those who (at the beginning of the round) have some units that someone else is
missing.
Claim: with payoffs (1) and C1 or C2-4, the upper bound for equilibrium streaming length is
T∗ = T + 2m + 1.
Proof: recall that the streaming length is the (natural) number of rounds needed to spread the
whole content CON over the whole population. Let
Nt
0 = {j ∈ N0 : Ct
j  ⊆ Ct
i for some i ∈ N}
Nt = {i ∈ N : Ct
i  ⊇ Ct
j for some j ∈ N0}
That is, Nt
0 ⊆ N0,t ≥ 0 is the set containing all those who at t have some content unit that at
least one peer is still missing. Clearly, the source is among them as long as content is produced:
0 ∈ Nt
0,0 ≤ t ≤ T. Similarly, Nt ⊆ N,t ≥ 0 is the set of all peers who at t still miss some unit.
Clearly, N = Nt,0 ≤ t ≤ T, because at any such a t no peer has unit ct yet, but the source 0 ∈ N0
has this unit. Also note that |Nt
0| > 0 as long as the whole content has not been distributed over
the whole population.
Now consider that if C1 is satisﬁed, then C2 and C4 also are, while C3 surely is not. Hence,
under the above hypothesis, condition C4 deﬁnitely holds. As already mentioned, this latter con-
dition states that players always prefer to make a valid request through a link where congestion
is 1 rather than through one where congestion is > 1, independently from what (non-empty)
additional content is reachable through the links. On the other hand, at equilibrium each peer
makes a valid request in each round as long as the whole content CON is not fully received. This
guarantees that      
 
j ∈ Nt
0 : σ
j
Ct(A) > 0
       = min{|Nt
0|,|Nt|} (3)
for any node Ct that may be reached at any time 0 ≤ t ≤ T∗ along some game course. Put it
differently, in any round t the number of exchanged or distributed (i.e. sent and received) units
equals the minimum between the number of those who at t have a unit that at least one peer is
still missing and the number of those who at t still miss some unit. Accordingly, streaming length
is maximized when |Nt
0| is kept to its minimum at each t.
As shown by fastest streaming proﬁles, any of the units c0,c1,...cT minimally takes m + 1
rounds to be distributed over the whole population. While the source keeps putting in circulation
one new unit in each round the number of those who have one unit that someone else misses
minimally increases by 1 in each round, till the whole number of peers or the end of content
production, whatever ﬁrst, is reached: |Nt
0| ≥ |N
t−1
0 | + 1 for 0 < t < min{2m − 1,T}, with
N0
0 = {0} (i.e. |N0
0| = 1; in fact, |Nt
0| ≤ 2m + 1 because Nt
0 ⊆ N0). Hence, in order to have
maximum streaming length this last inequality must be an equality, which requires, in turn, each
unit to be streamed, up to round t = min{2m − 1,T} inclusive, along a same ﬁxed tree where all
peers have out-degree=1, apart from the one who is the last to receive every unit. In other terms,
each unit is received by peers one after the other according to a same ﬁxed linear order such as
(for example) the natural one 1 < 2 <     < n.
If T ≤ 2m − 1, then such a linearly ordered streaming induces, at time T + 1 (i.e. at the end
of round T) the game tree node CT+1 = (C
T+1
1 ,...,CT+1
n ) where C
T+1
1 = CON and C
T+1
i =
C
T+1
i−1 \cT−i+1 for i = 2,...,n. That is, maintaining the example given by the natural order for
the sake of simplicity, at T + 1 peer 1 has the whole content CON, while each peer i = 2,...,n
misses the last i − 1 units cT,cT−1,...,cT−i+1. Now consider the whole streaming tree: it must
(eventually) consist of (T + 1)n (directed) edges, out of which T + 1 have the source as one end-
vertex, while (T + 1)(n − 1) are P2P links. At game tree node CT+1 the source has exhausted
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its role, and
 
2≤i≤n(i − 1) =
 n
2
 
P2P links are still missing. In particular, peer n, at time T + 1,
still misses units CT,CT−1,...,CT−n+1. Accordingly, this peer needs further rounds T + 1,T +
2,...,T + n for getting the whole content, because in each round only one unit can be received.
Then, given that the number of rounds has to include the very ﬁrst round 0, the whole streaming
length is T + n + 1 = T + 2m + 1.
The case T > 2m − 1 is handled in the same fashion. Following the above reasoning, at
t = n = 2m (i.e. at the end of round t = n−1) the reached game tree node is Ct = (Ct
0,Ct
1,...,Ct
n)
with Ct
1 = CONt−1 = CONn−1 and Ct
i = Ct
i−1\cn−i+1 for i = 2,...,n (where the natural order
is again the used example), and of course Ct
0 = {ct}. Also, in this round t = n we have |Nt
0| = n
and thus |Nt
0 ∩N| = n−1. Now, as long as the source is among the senders, in order to maintain
the streaming on a time-path displaying maximum length, we need to stay with the condition
|Nt
0| = |N
t−1
0 | = n for all n+1 ≤ t ≤ T. This means that the linear order according to which peers
one after the other receive each unit ct,0 ≤ t ≤ n is also maintained for the distribution of units
ct
′
,n+1 ≤ t′ ≤ T. But then at T +1 we reach exactly the same content distribution over peers as
for the previous case (i.e. T ≤ 2m−1, apart from the fact that the whole content now is greater, of
course). Hence, the whole streaming tree gets again completed in T +n+1 = T +2m+1 rounds. •
For any social planner (such as the source), all peers are identical. Therefore the number
of rounds needed to distribute the whole content over the whole population is a very important
index for evaluating streaming performance. In our scenario, a main concern is with mechanisms
that guide individual selﬁsh behavior towards desirable outcomes. In other terms, equilibrium
proﬁles should (hopefully) yield outcomes quite close to socially optimal ones. If these latter are
fastest streaming proﬁles, then the number of rounds needed to spread the whole content over
the whole population is T +m+1. Hence, although worst-case equilibrium streaming length is a
linear function of both the whole number T +1 of produced units and the whole number n = 2m
of peers, it can be much greater than the socially optimal streaming length. Attention now turns
on how to close this gap by means of a dynamic mechanism for constraining per node individual
strategies so to stay as close as possible to fastest streaming proﬁles.
7 Strategy Restriction
The issue of strategy conﬁguration and/or restriction arises most interestingly when players can
choose more facilities (as in [21] and in a version of our model, detailed below, with non-singleton
strategies). Still, itmay well be conceived when strategies are singletons as well. This isespecially
true in the setting developed thus far, where it translates into the following: certain peers i ∈ N at
certain nodes C ∈ N cannot ask to receive from certain j ∈ N0. In other terms, restrictions apply
to per node strategies, which here (already) take the form of per node sequences of singletons. As
already observed, without restrictions the proposed model (with (1) and C1) yields a symmetric
monotone congestion game with no bad conﬁguration, where equilibria are strong and Pareto-
optimal. Adding restrictions for strategies has to deal with symmetry, precisely because certain
peers at certain nodes cannot, by restriction, ask to receive from certain j ∈ N0, while some
others can. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in our setting this kind of restriction (although
in a weaker fashion) appears in any case, naturally. To see this, consider that peers’ per node
payoffs depend only on what valid requests are made at the nodes. Accordingly, at any node
C ∈ N and for any i,i′ ∈ N,j,j′ ∈ N0 it may well be Cj  ⊆ Ci ⊇ Cj′ and Cj′  ⊆ Ci′ ⊇ Cj, in which
case i can make a valid request to j but not to j′, while i′ can make a valid request to j′ but not to
j.
It is possible that at an equilibrium strategy proﬁle A each content unit ct,0 ≤ t ≤ T gets
distributed over new 2k−1 peers in each round t+k,k = 1,...,m (thus reaching the whole popu-
lation in m+1 rounds, which is optimal in terms of streaming length). Yet, such a proﬁle A cannot
be deterministic. That is, it must result in some congestion σ
j
C(A) > 1 for some j−C-entries of the
associated congestion matrix σ(A), as at any equilibrium each peer i ∈ N makes a valid request
to receive from each node {C0,C1,...,Cn} = C ∈ N such that Ci  = CON. Hence, equilibrium
proﬁles A surely yield some congestion, and provide a streaming length which ranges from the
optimal (i.e. minimum) one T + m + 1 to the worst-case one T + 2m + 1. From a social planner
perspective, there are two priorities when designing strategy restriction mechanisms:
• at equilibrium (with strategy restrictions) streaming length should be T + m + 1, the same
as with fastest streaming proﬁles;
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• congestion should be minimized.
In fact, those restrictions that ensure a fastest streaming length (i.e. the former condition) also
minimize congestion. This is because in fastest streaming proﬁles there is a whole central phase
Ph2 where streaming occurs through one-to-one matching involving all peers both as senders
and as receivers (apart from one peer, who never forwards, and the source, who never receives).
Any equilibrium proﬁle satisfying the former condition also has to fulﬁll this latter requirement,
which quantitatively translates into null congestion, over phase Ph2.
Consider a strategy restriction mechanism which speciﬁes from what j ∈ N0 each peer i ∈ N
can ask for content at each node C = Ct = (Ct
1,...,Ct
n) the game may reach up to any time t (or
end of round t − 1). In other terms, the mechanism speciﬁes for any node C = (C0,C1,...,Cn)
and for any i ∈ N,j ∈ N0 such that Cj  ⊆ Ci, whether it may be j = Ai(C) or not. In particular,
in view of the above main constraint or recurrence R1-3 that fastest streaming casts on stream-
ing tree evolution, consider the following per node restriction mechanism RM: for all i ∈ N and
Ct ∈ N
if Ct
i ∋ ct−k for some k ≤ m − 1,
then Ai(Ct)  = j for all j ∈ N0 such that Ct
j ∋ ct−k
′
for some k′ < m;
if Ct
i  ∋ ct−m,
then Ai(Ct) = j for some j ∈ N0 such that Ct
j ∋ ct−m.
In this way, for each game tree node Ct that may be reached, strategies for round t (or at
node C = Ct) are constrained precisely in the manner established by the above mentioned main
constraint R1-3 on streaming tree evolution. That is, if, given previous history, a peer in t has
some content unit ct−k that must be forwarded in round t + 1 (i.e. such that t − k + m ≥ t + 1),
then in this round t the peer cannot ask to receive from those j ∈ N0 who in t have units ct−k
′
to
be also forwarded in round t + 1 (i.e. such that t − k′ + m > t). Still, it may be worth noticing
that while R1-3 are stated from the perspective of an overall coordinator, in terms of forwarders
and receivers, this RM is stated in terms of contents or, equivalently, in terms of the generic node
for which per node strategy restrictions apply. In this way, the demand for content is left to be
organized by selﬁsh (although equilibrium) behavior.
Any proﬁle A ∈ Nκn
0 yields a probability distribution pA
Ct over N t+1 for each game tree node
Ct that may be reached at any time 0 ≤ t ≤ T∗, that is, pA
Ct(Ct+1) is the probability of reaching
node Ct+1 from node Ct when chosen strategies are Ai(Ct),i ∈ N. Therefore,
 
Ct+1∈N t+1
pA
Ct(Ct+1) = 1 for all t ≥ 0,Ct ∈ N t,A ∈ Nκn
0 .
For given underlying probabilistic model (anyhow handling multiple valid requests whenever
there are, see above), any strategy proﬁle A ∈ Nκn
0 puts a probability pA on each game course
{C0,C1,...,CT∗} (or time sequence of content distributions over peers) identiﬁed by the follow-
ing product of conditional probabilities
pA({C0,C1,...,CT∗}) =
T∗−1  
t=0
pA
Ct(Ct+1),
where any t-th round5 starts at t and ends at t + 1. Let CA denote the set of all game courses
that may prevail with strictly positive probability through proﬁle A. In other terms, CA contains
all T∗ +1-sequences {C0,...,CT∗} or game courses on which A puts strictly positive probability,
that is, such that pA({C0,...,CT∗}) > 0.
Claim: if A ∈ Nκn
0 is an equilibrium (with payoffs (1) and C1 or C2-4) under RM, then for any
game course {C0,...,CT∗} ∈ CA both the following hold:
(a) |{i ∈ N : ct ∈ C
t+k
i }| = 2k−1 for k = 1,...,m + 1 and all 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
(b)
 
j∈N0 max{0,σ
j
Ct(A) − 1} = 2m − 2t+1 + 1,0 ≤ t < m,
5. If T∗ is the maximum conceivable streaming length, in rounds and starting with 0, then a game course ends at time
T∗, when round T∗ − 1 ends, although the whole content shall generically be completely distributed much in advance.
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j∈N0 max{0,σ
j
Ct(A) − 1} = 0,m ≤ t ≤ T,t = T + m,
 
j∈N0 max{0,σ
j
Ct(A) − 1} = 2t−T−1,T < t < T + m.
Proof: without restrictions, at any equilibrium peers make a valid request to receive content
in each round as long as some unit is still missing. With restrictions, until the whole CON is not
received peers make a valid request whenever restrictions allow them to. Hence, the demand
for content units (to be further forwarded) is always provided by peers’ utility maximization
at any node Ct ∈ {C0,...,CT∗} ∈ CA. Under constraint RM, content demand at each node is
convoyed towards valid requests which, whenever satisﬁed, allow for fastest streaming. On the
supply side, peers (and the source) always satisfy precisely one (random) valid request among
those received, and thus equilibrium conditions under RM yields that any resulting game course
distributes each content unit ct,0 ≤ t ≤ T as follows: in round t unit ct is received by some peer
from the source, while in each round t+k,k = 1,...,m the unit is received by new 2k−1 peers. In
particular, the two IF-THEN above state that at the beginning of any round t, if a peer has a unit
for which round t is not the m+1-th round of circulation, then the peer cannot ask to receive from
someone who also has some unit for which this round t is not the m + 1-th. Similarly, if a peer at
the beginning of any round t has not yet received unit ct−m (for which this is the m + 1-th round
of circulation), then the peer has to ask from someone who has ct−m. In this way, in any round
apart from very ﬁrst ones, a peer can ask for units to be further forwarded only if at the beginning
of the round the peer already has the unit for which this is the m+1-th round of circulation. This
scheduling results in fastest streaming, although with some congestion, as detailed hereafter.
Concerning (b), σ
j
C(A)−1 is the number of excess valid requests for any facility or pair j −C,
that is, the number of non-satisﬁed valid requests that j ∈ N0 receives at node C. Accordingly,  
j∈N0 max{0,σ
j
Ct(A) − 1} measures the whole (i.e. aggregate) number of excess valid requests
at any reached node Ct. In view of (a), the streaming is a fastest but non-deterministic one. This
means that it takes precisely T +m+1 rounds and that in order to count (excess) congestion, we
have to check how many times the above reasoning on fastest deterministic strategy proﬁles uses
one-to-one matchings between sets ofdifferentcardinalities. Morespeciﬁcally, ifcardinality is the
same, then the problem of ﬁnding some one-to-one matching is solved by equilibrium condition
(3) above. When a set of senders and a set of receivers, both of same cardinality, have to match,
at equilibrium receivers make their valid request each to a different sender. When cardinality is
different, some of those in excess shall be left out. The number of those left out at node Ct is
precisely
 
j∈N0 max{0,σ
j
Ct(A) − 1}. In addition to this we have that RM casts constraints on
excess valid requests. In particular, the second IF-THEN entails that when (the beginning of)
round m is reached and some unique peer will be still without unit c0, the excess demand of
valid requests will no longer, till the end of the streaming, take into account this peer’s demand.
In fact, this latter will always be matched with someone in the half of the population who sends
to the other half the unit for which the current round is the m + 1-th of circulation. The same
applies to those peers who ﬁrst start being excluded in the ﬁnal phase of the streaming: once
they miss, in some round t = T +1,...,T +m−1, a sender of some unit to be further forwarded,
they get among those who will be the last to receive the units ct+1−m,...,cT−1,cT which exhaust
their circulation in next rounds t + 1,...,T + m respectively.
This means that in rounds m ≤ t ≤ T there is no excess valid request (or congestion) at
all, because the sets of senders and receivers have the same cardinality: 2m−1 peers send to the
other half unit ct−m while receiving from 2m−1 − 1 of these latter, together with the source, units
ct,ct−1,...,ct−m+1 (respectively with available forwarders 20+20+21+22+   +2m−2 = 2m−1).
On the other hand, in initial rounds t = 0,1,...,m − 1, the numbers of (restricted) excess valid
requests respectively are 2m − 20,2m − 20 − 21,...,1, that is, 2m − 2t+1 + 1. Similarly, in rounds
t = T + 1,T + 2,...,T + m − 1 the numbers of (restricted) excess valid requests respectively are
20,21,...,2m−2, that is, 2t−T−1. Finally, in round T +m clearly there are no excess valid requests.
•
Restriction mechanism RM above is useful for exploiting selﬁsh behavior toward socially de-
sirable outcomes. In particular, the mechanism is simple and, most importantly, speciﬁes condi-
tions only in terms of the generic node Ct that may be reached at some time t during game course.
The pattern through which the system reaches this node is irrelevant; all that matters for strategy
restriction is content distribution over peers, which is precisely captured by the node itself. Any
outcome or game course constrained through the mechanism provides fastest streaming. That is,
each content unit is distributed over the whole population exactly in m+1 (consecutive) rounds,
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doubling the forwards in each round. In addition, given that fastest streaming (whether deter-
ministic or not) requires a central phase characterized by one-to-one matching between sets of
same cardinality, mechanism RM also minimizes congestion.
7.1 Non-singleton Strategies
The analysis thus far may lead to conceive mechanisms in real-time streaming scenarios where
each peer has some (exogenously given) neighborhood or pool, containing the source together with
some other peers, and keeps track of neighbors’ content. Then, each peer in each round makes a
valid request (if any) to someone in the pool. In this case, peers do not enter the streaming (game)
with a strategy, in a strict sense, as they do not specify a peer (or a set of peers) to ask for content
at each game tree node. More loosely, they approach the environment with some general rule,
based on local observation: peers i ∈ N respond to any reachable node Ct = (Ct
0,Ct
1,...,Ct
n) by
checking only those few components Ct
j,j ∈ N0 such that j is in i’s pool.
Formally, consider the extension of the model under concern where in any round t any peer
i ∈ N can ask to receive from a subset Ai(Ct) ⊂ N0, given any reached game tree node Ct.
The interpretation is: if in any round t any peer i receives, then an entire unit from a unique
j ∈ Ai(Ct) will be received; yet, the probability that i receives some unit of additional content at
Ct is the sum over j ∈ Ai(Ct) of the probability of receiving from j (which in turn shall depend
on how many others at Ct are also making valid requests to receive from j). In other terms, each
sender satisﬁes precisely one valid request and each receiver can have at most one valid request
satisﬁed, through which to receive some (i.e. one) unit of additional content.
In these terms, the game is one where at each node C, where C = (C0,C1,...,Cn), there is
a set of facilities Cj,j ∈ N0 each of which is viable for making a valid request only for those
peers i ∈ N such that Cj  ⊆ Ci. In addition, if one allows for unconstrained multiple valid
requests, then at each node C peers i ∈ N can make a valid request to all j’s in any subset of
Ji(C) = {j ∈ N0 : Cj  ⊆ Ci}. Now let |Ji(C)| ≥ 2 for some peer i ∈ N (which is most likely
at generic node C). Then there are two facilities Cj,Cj′ such that j,j′ ∈ Ji(C), and i can choose
either one of them or even both. This simple case is enough to give rise to a bad conﬁguration
(see above).
Accordingly, assume some pool N0(i) ⊂ N0 of any peer i ∈ N is given, and consider the case
where at each node C peers i make a valid request to receive from all those (if any) that allow for
in the pool, that is, Ai(C) = Ji(C) ∩ N0(i). In this case, single peers i ∈ N do not give rise to bad
conﬁgurations, because whenever there are two (or more) j,j′ ∈ N0 to whom they can make a
valid request, both are asked to send: Ai(C) ∋ j,j′. Nevertheless, there may well be three peers
i,i′,i′′ ∈ N and a node C where i makes a valid request through j, while i′ makes it through j′
and i′′ through both j,j′, which yields again a bad conﬁguration.
In general, although allowing for multiple valid requests should help the system to ﬁnd
matchings, still it seems hard to conceive it without giving rise to bad conﬁgurations (at cer-
tain game tree nodes). In any case, the congestion game has a non-empty set of (possibly non-
strong) equilibria, and however multiple valid requests were allowed, one may constrain them
by means of mechanism RM. That is to say, if at node C peer i ∈ N can validly ask from some
set Ai(C) ⊆ Ji(C) ∩ N0(i), then we can screen this latter set according to RM, so that if i in C
has some unit which is not in circulation for the m+1-th round, then Ai(C) cannot contain those
j ∈ N0 who also have units that are not in circulation for the m+1-th round. In this way, (a) above
entails that at equilibrium every unit ct reaches 2k−1 new peers in each round t+k,k = 1,...,m.
On the other hand, congestion will be much greater than in (b), precisely because each peer can
make more valid requests at most nodes. In particular, even the central phase, like the initial and
ﬁnal ones, shall display some congestion.
8 The Algorithm
For the case where the number of peers is a 2m,m ∈ N, we now detail our algorithm which
implements fastest streaming.
From the scheme previously described, it is clear that if we want that peers coordinate them-
selves to obtain a fastest distribution of content units, they must be aware of the complete distri-
bution process. In other words, peers must be made able to precisely calculate, during each step,
which nodes send speciﬁc on-going content units to which receiving nodes.
This is however quite simple to do. It is sufﬁcient that peers share a seed to randomly generate
same sequences of pseudo-random numbers. Stated differently, this shared value is employed
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to randomly select those peers that will receive a given content unit by some other peers. In
practice, the shared seed serves as the coordinator among nodes. This approach avoids the use
of a central node that coordinates all others, that would imply a massive communication and
would make the protocol not exploitable in practical situations. Conversely, the execution of the
same algorithm together with the same generator guarantees that all peers can participate to the
protocol with a perfect knowledge of such distribution process.
The scheme is described in Algorithms 1 and 2. Algorithm 1 shows the main employed data
structures and the initialization step performed at each peer. During the initialization, the broad-
caster sends to all other peers such generated seed value.
The distribution loop in Algorithm 1 shows the behavior of the peer nodes, as well as the
broadcaster. It is possible to notice that the unique difference here is that the broadcaster is in
charge of creating a novel content unit at each step (line 1 of the broadcaster distribution loop,
Algorithm 1), while others do not.
The protocol consists of an iterative behavior. Each iteration t corresponds to the production
at the broadcaster of a novel content unit ct to be distributed to all peers. Meanwhile, on-going
content units ck,k = t − m,...m that have not yet been delivered to all peers are disseminated
based on our strategy (lines 4-8 of the distribution loop in Algorithm 1). The shared decision
on which nodes must provide on-going content units to which other nodes is determined in the
MANAGEDISTRIBUTION() procedure. Differences in the peers’ actions during the execution of
the protocol are determined by the Identiﬁcation Numbers (IDs) of the nodes, as shown in the
functions reported in Algorithm 2.
At each iteration, all nodes in N are selected to be the receivers of a single content unit they do
not possess. This is done by extracting these nodes from an auxiliary list NextFree, which is ini-
tialized to N (line 3) and then progressively emptied through different calls of the MANAGEDIS-
TRIBUTION() procedure (line 6 of the distribution loop in Algorithm 1, shown in Algorithm 2).
Speciﬁcally, given a content unit ck being distributed, a one-to-one association between peers that
have the content unit (senders Sk in the code) and some of those that do not (receivers Rk in the
code) is determined. Thus, at step i,(i = t − k > 0) of distribution of a given content unit, 2i
nodes have the content unit and 2i are selected to be the receivers.
Once the distribution for the ongoing content units is determined, a new content unit is pro-
duced at the broadcaster (line 9, Algorithm 1) and the MANAGEDISTRIBUTION() procedure is
called for the novel content unit.
We now describe the functions involved in the scheme in more details.
In MANAGEDISTRIBUTION(), a new receiver recv is identiﬁed (see NEXTRECV() procedure)
and the delivery of the content unit from the considered sender p to recv is scheduled (see MUST-
SEND()). Moreover, the node recv selected as receiver of this transmission is inserted in the list of
senders Sk for the content unit ck (line 5), so that it will be considered as an owner of ck in the
future. For this reason, recv is removed from the list of receivers Rk, as well as from the list of
those nodes that must be selected as receivers of some content unit (lines 5-6).
NEXTRECV() is responsible for the random selection of the receivers for a given content unit.
Stated simply, a node is randomly extracted until the node is one of those that are still waiting
that content unit and it has not already been considered to be the receiver of another content unit
during this time step.
Finally, MUSTSEND() is a procedure that allows to discriminate the different behavior of peers,
once the distribution is scheduled based on our approach. Thus, based on the ID of the node, the
peer understands whether it must send a content unit (in such a case it schedules the transmis-
sion) or receive a content unit (then, it waits).
9 Instances of Streaming Trees
In this Section we show a real showcase of the algorithm proposed in Section 8. In particular,
we consider a scenario composed of N = {1,...,8} nodes. First of all, in Figure 1 we show the
evolution of the tree originated by the diffusion of content unit 0 (c0). In detail, the tree nodes are
the peers in the live streaming process. Each arrow shows the transmission of the content unit
(the label associated to the arrows indicates the identiﬁcation value of the content unit, i.e. c0).
In this case, the ﬁst step (t = 0) is the transmission of c0 from the source to the peer 1. In
the following steps, the content unit is propagated in a logarithmic number of steps to all other
peers. It is worth noting that, at each step, each peer is responsible to transmit the content unit to
only another peer. In agreement with the rules of the game introduce in Section 3.
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Algorithm 1 The Algorithm
DATA STRUCTURES
1: NextFree,Si,Ri: list of nodes (i ∈ [0,T])
2: ci: set of content units (i ∈ [0,T])
3: s: seed to generate random values
INITIALIZATION
1: at all Peers
2: for all i ∈ [0,T] do
3: Si ← ∅,Ri ← ∅
4: end for
1: at the Broadcaster
2: s ← GENERATESEED()
3: BROADCAST(s)
DISTRIBUTION LOOP
1: at the Broadcaster
2: for all t ∈ [0,T] do
3: NextFree ← N = N0 \ {0}
4: for k = max(t − m,0) to t do
5: for all p ∈ Sk do
6: MANAGEDISTRIBUTION(p, k)
7: end for
8: end for
9: ct = NEWCHUNK()
10: MANAGEDISTRIBUTION(0, t)
11: end for
1: at other Peers
2: for all t ∈ [0,T] do
3: NextFree ← N = N0 \ {0}
4: for k = max(t − m,0) to t do
5: for all p ∈ Sk do
6: MANAGEDISTRIBUTION(p, k)
7: end for
8: end for
9: MANAGEDISTRIBUTION(0, t)
10: end for
In Figure 2, the step-by-step distribution of the different content units being transmitten
among the peers is depicted. In this case, each sub-ﬁgure shows only the content units trans-
mittend in a given round (t = [0,...,4]). The rounds from 0 up to 2 are the bootstrap of the
streaming algorithm, starting from round 3 the protocol reaches its steady state. Again, it is
worth noting that each peer sends at most a single content unit (and the same is true also for the
receiving), also in this case fulﬁlling the game rules.
10 Concluding Remarks
A main idea proposed in this paper is to model real-time streaming in terms of congestion games.
Basically, peers or players are all identical: in each round or step of the game they aim at receiv-
ing some additional content unit, until all units have been received. In particular, each peer can
receive only one unit, at most, per round and satisﬁes precisely one (randomly selected) request
to forward among those received. This main assumption characterizing our setting crucially
constraints streaming length, intended as the number of rounds needed to spread the whole con-
tent over the whole population. Apart from duration, peers’ payoffs also depend on congestion:
speciﬁcally, content distribution over peers obviously changes in time, and for any such a distri-
bution, prevailing at any time, the associated per round payoffs to peers depend on how many
requests to send are addressed to each peer (and to the source, who produces content units and
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Figure 1. Streaming tree for distribution of c
0, N = {1,...,8}
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Figure 2. Step-by-step distribution graph, t = [0,...,4], N = {1,...,8}
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Algorithm 2 Functions
1: function MANAGEDISTRIBUTION(p, t)
2: recv ← NEXTRECV
 
Rt,s
 
3: MUSTSEND
 
p,recv,ct 
4: ADD
 
recv,St 
5: REMOVE
 
recv,Rt 
6: REMOVE
 
recv,NextFree
 
1: function NEXTRECV(AvailRecvs,seed)
2: repeat
3: n ← RANDOMPEER(seed)
4: until n ∈ NextFree ∩ AvailRecvs
5: return n
1: function MUSTSEND(send,recv,c)
2: p = IDNODE()
3: if (p == send) then
4: SCHEDULESEND(recv,c)
5: else
6: if (p == recv) then
7: WAIT(c)
8: end if
9: end if
ﬁrstly injects them into the P2P system). The intuition behind this is that some underlying and
unknown probabilistic model handles all those cases where two or more peers ask to receive from
a common other peer or from the source. However these cases are handled, given that anyone
can forward at most one content unit per round, the greater the number of peers who all ask
to receive from a common other peer or from the source, the less likely for each of them to be
precisely the one who actually receives. For the resulting game we provide an exact potential, so
that every potential-maximizer strategy proﬁle is a pure-strategy equilibrium. If peers can ask to
receive from only one other peer at most (or from the source) in each round, then strategies are se-
quences of singletons: for a peer a strategy speciﬁes, for any content distribution over the whole
population, who (i.e. either another peer or the source) to send a request for additional content
units. With singleton strategies the provided potential is strong, any of whose maximizers is a
strong equilibrium.
Our analysis develops from the observation that if the number n of peers is a power of 2, that
is, n = 2m for some natural m, then P2P exchange of content units can be scheduled in a way
such that each unit gets distributed over the whole population in m + 1 consecutive rounds, and
therefore the corresponding streaming length is T+m+1. This means that each unit is distributed
in a minimum number (i.e. m+1) of rounds and, most importantly, that units’ distribution can be
nested in a way such that in most rounds the number of exchanged units is 2m+1, which means
that each peer receives some unit and all peers apart from one, and the source, also forward some
unit. Accordingly, we ﬁrst determine the worst-case equilibrium streaming length, which is T +
2m+1. Next, we provide a strategy restriction mechanism RM which, for any content distribution
over peers, allows each peer to ask for additional content only from certain other peers (or from
thesource). Simplethoughitis, thismechanismseemsveryuseful, becauseitpreventsthesystem
from satisfying those requests that selﬁsh peers would make at equilibrium and that must not be
satisﬁed in order to a have a streaming of minimum length. Hence, with this RM at equilibrium
the streaming length is actually at its minimum T+m+1, and therefore attention can be placed on
theattainedcongestion. ItturnsoutthatRMalsominimizescongestion, becauseinanystreaming
of minimum length for most rounds there must be some one-to-one matching involving all peers
twice, both as receivers and senders.
If the number n of peers is not a power of 2, then the fastest way to distribute the whole
content over the whole population is, if possible, to partition the population into blocks each of
which has cardinality equal to some power of 2, and next to have multiple sources, one for each
block, so to serve each block separately and according to constraint RM (which yields fastest
streaming for populations that are powers of 2). Blocks’ cardinalities would be n1 = 2⌊log(n)⌋,
n2 = 2⌊log(n−n1)⌋,..., nk = 2⌊log(n−n1−   −nk−1)⌋. In the worst case, the number n of peers is
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n = 20 + 21 +     + 2h for some natural h, that is, n = 2h+1 − 1, which would require the source
to multiply by h + 1 its activity for serving h + 1 different blocks. Streaming length would be
T + log(n1) + 1.
Our basic assumption that peers and the source in each period satisfy precisely one of the
requests that they receive in practice entails that in our model free-riding is not a feasible strategy.
In fact, if the source forwards each content unit only once, then allowing for peers’ free-riding
would make it difﬁcult to have ﬁnite streaming lengths. In any case, given that for each content
unit our model builds a new substreaming tree specifying how the unit gets distributed across
the whole population through P2P exchanges, any reputation-based mechanism that makes free-
riding a dominated strategy in tree-based multicast systems is applicable here [38].
The loss in the sum of players’ payoffs when switching from an outcome that maximizes
such a sum to an equilibrium outcome is the so-called price of anarchy. For a game with positive
payoffs, such a price is formally deﬁned as the ratio of the maximal expected social payoff (i.e.
the sum of players’ expected payoffs) to the maximal expected social payoff obtained at a mixed-
strategy equilibrium [35]. Apart from this formal deﬁnition, attention can be placed on the price
of anarchy of pure-strategy equilibria; speciﬁcally, one may be interested in its upper bound [15].
The concern is the following: given that coordinating players is unfeasible and therefore the
system has to be governed by (equilibrium) selﬁsh behavior, it becomes important to know how
less than maximum social worth can this yield, in the worst case.
Given that social worth obtains as the sum of players’ payoff, and given that the payoff func-
tion is the same for all players (which are therefore identical from a social planner perspective)
in our setting, any game course or outcome can be socially evaluated in terms of the resulting
streaming length and the sum over all encountered nodes of the congestion there registered. This
seems also in line with the aim to work with congestion game forms, where players’ payoffs
need not be speciﬁed provided they are monotone and, in our setting, fulﬁll some other general
requirement. Ex post, any game course {Ct} = {C0,...,CT∗} ∈ CA resulting from strategy pro-
ﬁle A is evaluated in terms of its associated streaming length sl({Cn}) = min{0 ≤ t ≤ T∗ : Ct
i =
CON for all i ∈ N}, and sum σA({Ct}) =
 
0≤t<T∗
 
j∈N0 min{0,σ
j
Ct(A) − 1} over all nodes
of congestion. In particular, consider any function φ( , ) taking values on pairs (k,h) of natural
numbers where the ﬁrst is streaming length while the second is overall congestion. From the
above observations, φ(h,k) > φ(h′,k) whenever h < h′ and φ(h,k) > φ(h,k′) whenever k < k′.
As long as the number of peers is a power of 2, that is n = 2m, this function takes the same value
φ(T + m + 1,0) over any fastest streaming strategy proﬁle A ∈ A∗ (see section V) and associated
game course {Ct}; this is the maximum value that φ( , ). This function also takes the same con-
stant value
φ(T + m + 1,
 
0≤t<m
(2m − 2t+1 + 1) +
 
T+1≤t≤T+m−1
2t−T−1)
over all proﬁles A (and associated game courses) that constitute an equilibrium with RM. Finally,
without RM, on worst-case equilibrium strategy proﬁles A (see section VI) function φ takes value
φ(T + 2m + 1,
 2
m
2
 
).
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